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JURIES IN U.S. PATENT CASES: 
A COMPARATIVE PORTRAIT OF THE BOUNDARIES OF 
DEMOCRACY 
M. Neil Browne1 
Nancy K. Kubasek2 
Alex Q. Jacobs3 
“It is clear that juries will necessarily differ in ‘competence,’ but it 
is at best incongruous to suggest that a society that sends its citizens 
routinely into space could never produce a jury competent to 
determine a case some judge might consider too ‘complex’ for 
people with ‘common experience’ to decide.”4 
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consistent basis. In addition, Markey’s chosen metaphor does little to help his 
argument, as rocket scientists and astronauts are far from typical citizens. Both 
occupations are extremely specialized and require massive amounts of both 
education and experience—practically the opposite concept of a civil jury 
consisting of “average” lay citizens. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The optimal boundaries of democracy are persistently 
challenged even in countries like the United States, with its 
relatively long history of democratic traditions. When we suggest 
that almost anyone possesses the cognitive and emotional training 
and competence to make a particular decision, we are assuming the 
complexity of that decision does not require special expertise that 
would need to be acquired through training and reflective 
experience. Consequently, expertise and democracy have always 
been awkward roommates. 
Expertise is increasingly seen in many contexts as just another 
point of view.5 Multiple factors have complemented the natural 
drive of our egos to see our conclusions as just as good as those of 
anyone else. For instance, our news industry has emerged as a 24-
hour entertainment venue where argumentative fervor is a 
replacement for slow, reflective sharing of diverse observations.6 
Another factor in the burgeoning disrespect for expertise is the ease 
with which anyone can now use the Internet to cherry pick reasons 
to buttress whatever conclusion people wish to believe. Finally, 
student appraisal of what happens on campus is now protected 
                                                 
 5 See TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017). This compelling and 
important book discusses the causes and dangers of the idea that all opinions are 
worthy of equal respect. In other words, whatever method of knowing a person 
uses, his or her conclusions deserve an identical hearing. That idea is consistent 
with direct election of Supreme Court Justices, the evaluation of middle school 
students by their teachers, and accepting the conclusions of celebrities who 
counsel us to refrain from vaccinating our children for measles. 
 6 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013). This magisterial 
comparison of (1) the dangers associated with speedy thinking that draws upon a 
huge array of cognitive biases and (2) the rich harvest from slow, systematic, and 
contextualized thinking should give pause to any consumer of the fever-pitch 
pronouncements that are the lifeblood of major contemporary news channels. 
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because of the emergence of customer satisfaction models in higher 
education; in turn, this has an immediate impact on university 
revenue.7 
This article aspires to encourage legislators and jurisprudential 
scholars to re-examine the optimal boundaries of democracy. The 
complexity of patent disputes provides an illustration of a legal 
setting that almost all of us would agree is highly complex. The idea 
of a jury of citizen peers is a hallowed component of the American 
legal system. But principles and high-sounding abstractions cry out 
for cautious application because pursuing them in extreme forms 
risks trampling on conflicting principles. For example, we may be 
devoted to free speech, but a shout of “Fire!” reminds us public 
safety should not be sacrificed on an altar of devotion to robust 
public discourse. An examination of the adjudication process for 
patent cases in multiple countries provides us with a laboratory in 
which alternative attitudes toward the proper scope of democracy 
are modelled. 
II.  THE AMERICAN INFATUATION WITH THE SKILLS OF JURORS 
Chief Judge Markey’s comments in SRI International v. 
Matsushita Electric Corp. reveal obvious disdain for those who 
question the capabilities of lay juries, even in complicated patent 
cases. Throughout his decade-long tenure as head of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”), Markey consistently 
promoted the “fundamental Constitutional right” to a jury in civil 
cases—including patent trials.8 His opinions contributed to the rapid 
                                                 
 7 See Bea González, Students as Customers: The New Normal in Higher 
Education, THE EVOLLLUTION (Oct. 28, 2016), https://evolllution.com/ 
attracting-students/customer_service/students-as-customers-the-new-normal-in-
higher-education/. As public support for higher education has dwindled, 
universities are more and more forced to embrace market logic as their 
institutional organizational framework. Revenue projections are then based on 
pleasing the customer base, providing the students with the housing, curriculum, 
and recreational opportunities they prefer. That students may need guidance from 
trained professionals in reshaping their preferences to match their long-run needs 
is seen as unfairly paternalistic. The students’ desires are accepted as the major 
driver for the shaping of university services. 
 8 John R. Alison, The Role of Juries in Managing Patent Enforcement: Judge 
Howard Markey’s Opinions and Writings, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
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rise of jury trials for such cases in U.S. district courts.9 In addition 
to Judge Markey’s enthusiastic support, the creation of standardized 
rules for jury instructions and interrogatories caused an increase in 
jury trials for patent cases.10 While the right to a jury trial has been 
preserved since the creation of the Bill of Rights,11 juries themselves 
were relatively uncommon in American patent litigation until the 
last few decades. In 1978, just over eight percent of all U.S. patent 
trials were argued before a jury;12 by 2011, lay juries participated in 
almost seventy-five percent of cases involving patent disputes.13 
This massive increase in the number of jury trials, combined 
with the special complexity of patent litigation,14 begs the question: 
are juries competent enough to make fair decisions in long, highly 
technical patent suits? Chief Judge Markey’s position was clear: he 
dismissed the idea that juries were incapable of understanding 
complicated scientific and technical issues.15 Instead, Markey 
                                                 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 41, 41–43 (2009) (“[B]y the time he left the bench in 1989, jury 
trials in patent cases had become common, and now are the norm.”). 
 9 See id. at 41. 
 10 See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1673, 1674–75 (2013) (revealing the surprising increase in the use of juries 
in patent trials over the last several decades). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[T]he right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and 
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). 
 12 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 211 (1998). 
 13 See Mark A. Lemley, et al., Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and Outcomes 
in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q. J. 169, 172–73 (2013) (explaining that of the 624 
patent trials between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2011, 466 trials, or 74.7%, 
were tried before juries). 
 14 See Jordan M. Halle, Avoiding Those Wearing Propeller Hats: The Use of 
Blue Ribbon Juries in Complex Patent Litigation, 43 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 435–
36 (2014) (“However, while inventions as complicated as an engine the size of a 
single molecule have been developed, the juries tasked with analyzing claims to 
patents for such technology have not changed. At trial, the parties are likely to call 
expert witnesses to attempt to clarify complex scientific breakthroughs, but the 
matter discussed may be so far beyond the comprehension, training, and 
experience of the lay jury that fact-finding is rendered impossible.”). 
 15 Alison, supra note 8, at 43–44. Markey argued juries were already proven 
effective in the courtroom for civil and criminal cases involving complex fact 
patterns and legal applications, and thus a complexity exception for patent cases 
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promoted better trial organization,16 such as simplification of how 
evidence is introduced to the jury, as well as creation of more 
specific verdicts as a way to focus jury attention on “key issues.”17 
The backbone of Markey’s support for the use of juries18 is the 
Seventh Amendment.19 He firmly believed the Bill of Rights 
guaranteed the right to a trial by jury no matter the circumstance, 
and for this reason he rebuffed court suggestions that some cases 
demanded a “complexity exception[]”20 to skirt around use of 
juries.21 
                                                 
was unnecessary. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 
1130–31 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 16 Alison, supra note 8, at 45. We have little doubt increasing procedural clarity 
in the courtroom would help juries (and perhaps even some judges). However, the 
effect of such changes is limited by the extent to which they represent a problem 
in the legal system. If deeper issues exist—such as the presence of natural 
limitations of civil juries’ capabilities—all the clarity improvements in the world 
may not have much effect, and in that case Markey’s argument would be little 
more than wishful thinking. 
 17 Id.; see also SRI Int’l, 775 F.2d at 1128–32 (providing additional views of 
Chief Justice Markey). 
 18 Alison, supra note 8, at 45 (quoting Markey in SRI Int’l as arguing, “[J]udges 
are nowhere authorized to exercise their personal predilection by revising or 
repealing the Seventh Amendment . . . To permit a judicial interpretation of a 
constitutional provision that destroys another constitutional provision is to place 
at risk the entire Constitution.”). While Chief Judge Markey is far from the only 
supporter of lay juries, his high-profile position and the extent to which he wrote 
about preserving Seventh Amendment rights suggest his arguments are 
reasonable representations of thinkers who advocate relatively strict interpretation 
of the Constitution. 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 20 Daniel P. Sullivan, Must the Jury Reach a Verdict? The Constitutionality of 
Eliminating Juries in Patent Trials by Creating an Article I Tribunal, 7 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 754, 765–66 (2008) (“Over the last thirty years, 
the courts have begun to invoke a complexity exception, where a judge may 
remove a complex issue of law or fact from a jury and decide the issue herself.”); 
see also James Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh 
Amendment Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031, 1032 (2010) 
(analyzing the historical contexts during the creation of the Bill of Rights that 
would allow for a complexity exception in today’s common law). 
 21 Alison, supra note 8, at 45–46. Chief Judge Markey also fought against the 
“injection of ‘expertise’” and specialization into the American legal system. Id. 
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Other commentators interpret the Seventh Amendment not as a 
guaranteed right applicable to all situations, but as a safeguard to 
preserve a basic democratic element of the American judicial 
system.22 Support for this argument comes from the ambiguous 
language used in the Amendment itself,23 as well as circumstances 
surrounding its creation.24 Various courts have put forth similar 
justifications in the past few decades to carve out exceptions to the 
jury trial right.25 
Of these court decisions, two stand out as highly skeptical of 
jury capabilities. In the first, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust 
                                                 
 22 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (explaining that “[o]nly 
those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the 
essence of the system of trial by jury” are preserved by the Seventh Amendment); 
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (“[T]he Amendment was 
designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental 
elements.”). In other words, some argue the right to a jury trial is not mandated in 
every civil case; rather, it merely must be available as part of the legal system at 
large. 
 23 Sullivan, supra note 20, at 755 (explaining that “[w]hile the Framers all 
agreed on the importance of a civil jury, there was no consensus as to the extent 
of this right,” and further, the final amendment was “purposefully vague” due to 
the Framers’ “inability to determine which cases were (and were not) appropriate 
for juries to decide . . .”); see also Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret 
the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1008–
12 (1992) (discussing the establishment of the Seventh Amendment right). 
 24 One source discusses: 
In the end, the debate returns to the fundamental question: What 
right to trial by jury in suits at common law was preserved by 
the Seventh Amendment? If a complex civil case in 1791 in 
England would either not have gone to a jury at all or would 
have gone to a form of jury that is today unlawful (the jury of 
experts, the special jury of merchants), it follows that a 
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment should be 
constitutionally unobjectionable.  
Oldham, supra note 20, at 1053 (emphasis in original); see also Edith Guild 
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 
289–91 (1966). 
 25 Sullivan, supra note 20, at 765 (“Courts have been able to whittle away a 
right to a jury trial because the right to a civil jury trial is not fundamental and 
because the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee 
that juries are the sole fact finders.”). 
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Litigation26 that it was constitutional to remove a case from the 
jury’s responsibility if the complexities of the case were so great 
they raised due process concerns.27 Years later the Supreme Court 
ruled in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,28 that claim 
construction—the process by which the patent claims at issue are 
carefully interpreted and defined29—was a matter of law, not fact, 
and thus was to be decided not by juries but by the courts.30 Many 
commentators agree claim construction is an extremely important 
part of a case’s outcome,31 so the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Markman yields more crucial questions about which aspects of 
patent trials, if any, are suitable for jury deliberation. 
Concerns about jury responsibilities extend further if one 
examines the performance of district court judges in patent cases. 
These generalist judges immerse themselves in the legal system 
and—by nature of their job—are much more comfortable with a 
variety of legal terms and procedures than a lay person. Hence, one 
would expect to see this experience reflected in patent litigation at 
the district court level. However, many generalist trial judges 
display a severely inadequate understanding of the criteria for the 
Daubert test, which is essential for admitting proper scientific 
                                                 
 26 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
 27 Id. at 1084. But see Alison, supra note 8, at 45 (invoking Chief Judge 
Markey’s discussion in SRI Int’l regarding the slippery slope of judicial decisions 
that attempt to point out conflicts between Constitutional Amendments). 
 28 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 29 Greg Reilly, Patent “Trolls” and Claim Construction, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1045, 1045 (2016) (“Patent claim construction—the interpretation of the 
short paragraphs (or ‘claims’) at the end of the patent that define the scope of the 
patentee’s rights—is ‘overwhelmingly the most critical patent issue in 
litigation.’”). 
 30 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. 
 31 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Mayer, C.J., concurring) (“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to 
decide the case.”); see Reilly, supra note 29, at 1051 (“Claim construction is 
widely recognized as the most important step in patent litigation. It is a threshold 
step for virtually every other issue in a patent case.”); see also Kimberly A. 
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2001) (arguing the results of claim construction frequently 
predict the outcome of the case). 
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evidence from expert witnesses.32 Because the validity of such 
scientific evidence becomes crucial in deciding many patent cases, 
the fact that few state trial court judges can establish the criteria for 
accepting such evidence is worrisome. To argue by extension, if 
these judges—with strong legal backgrounds and years of 
experience as actual judges—have trouble identifying valid expert 
witnesses, how would a lay jury have a fighting chance of doing a 
credible job accomplishing the same daunting task? And if both 
sides present opposing experts who seem to make valid points, by 
what prior skills or knowledge are jury members expected to weigh 
the credibility and accuracy of specialized scientists and 
technicians? 
Recent empirical evidence further advances the case against lay 
juries. One study reveals a twelve percent advantage for the patentee 
in cases decided by juries versus those presided over by a judge.33 
Another describes jurors as more apt to sympathetically support 
small entities or individual inventors in disputes against big 
companies.34 Still more evidence suggests juries are less proficient 
at sifting through multi-issue cases and deciding each claim on its 
own merits; rather, jury members more often side with one party for 
                                                 
 32 Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem, 
5 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1537–41, 1557 (2017) (suggesting that trial judges are in 
a unique position to keep junk science out of the courtroom yet routinely fail to 
do so due to factors such as lack of scientific knowledge and reliability on mental 
heuristics). The article also notes judges statistically have a massive bias toward 
admitting prosecution experts over defense experts, with 95.8% of the former 
being admitted at trial versus 7.8% of the latter. Id. See generally Keelah E. G. 
Williams & Michael J. Saks, Why Don’t the Gatekeepers Guard the Gates? 
Comments Prompted by Edmond, 36 ADEL. L. REV. 109 (2015) (exploring the 
failure of trial judges to adequately understand and apply Daubert and examining 
the judicial worldviews that would lead to this failure). 
 33 See Lemley et al., supra note 13, at 173 (detailing that from 2000 to 2011, 
patentees succeeded in roughly 63% of cases decided by juries, but only 51% of 
suits heard by judges for a sixteen-year period). 
 34 Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 81 (2007) 
(“The data, however, show that in jury trials from 1990–2003, individuals won 
74% of patent lawsuits against corporations. There was no similar discrimination 
in bench trials. In fact, corporations were slightly more successful with judges 
when their adversaries were individuals. Individuals prevailed against 
corporations in only 46% of bench trials.”). 
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all issues in a patent suit.35 Besides these patent-specific studies, a 
vast array of social science research on the questionable 
effectiveness of lay juries is more than enough to raise serious 
concerns of fairness—even for the most ardent advocate of lay 
participation in the law.36 
III.  IMPACT OF INEQUALITY ON THE WISDOM OF USING 
AMERICAN JURIES FOR PATENT PROTECTION 
Another danger in maintaining the current state of American 
patent litigation is the vastly unequal distribution of power between 
large, resource-rich corporations and individual entities.37 For 
example, consider the fact that the “vast majority of licensing 
revenues are collected by large firms”38 and “small companies are 
less likely to litigate to protect their patents.”39 One might infer small 
                                                 
 35 Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek 
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 nn.7–8 (2000) (“The data 
suggests that judges are statistically more capable of resolving cases issue-by-
issue instead of case-by-case.”). 
 36 See THEODORE EISENBERG ET AL., JUDGE-JURY AGREEMENT IN CRIMINAL 
CASES: A PARTIAL REPLICATION OF KALVEN AND ZEISEL’S THE AMERICAN JURY 343 
(Cornell Law Faculty Publications 2005) (Partially replicating Kalven and 
Zeisel’s The American Jury (1966, Little and Brown), which found that judges 
and juries give conflicting verdicts for the same cases about 20% of the time. This 
study found similar results. This replication also found that as evidence gets more 
complex and/or technical, juries disagree with judges even more often (as much 
as 54% in high-complexity cases).); see also Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the 
Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 4 (2007) (finding that judges 
and juries disagree about 23% of the time. While these figures tend to favor 
agreement between judges and juries, the fact that juries disagree with judges in 
almost a quarter of all cases seems to provide a troubling outlook for the fairness 
of trials.). 
 37 Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a 
Costly Barrier to Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184, 
184 (2004) (“[I]n today’s legal environment, small businesses and individual 
inventors holding patents are placed at a significant disadvantage when their 
patents are challenged by large businesses.”). 
 38 Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 641 (2007). 
 39 Ronspies, supra note 37, at 197; see Richard W. Goldstein & Donika P. 
Pentcheva, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION (AIPLA), 
LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
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entities are also less likely to file for patents, but this is far from the 
case.40 Additionally, the average quality and ingenuity of 
individuals’ patents does not appear to be the issue, as one 
commentator notes “[o]ver half of the sixty-one most important 
innovations of the 20th century came from independent inventors or 
small firms.”41 If creativity and originality are not essential causal 
factors, why the discrepancy in who benefits from patent protection? 
In many instances patent infringement disputes are “make it or 
break it” for individuals and small businesses, whereas powerful 
corporations often have the capability to survive an unfavorable 
judgment—and the capital to prolong a case on appeal for years.42 
The complex nature of patent suits demands lengthy, highly 
technical trials, often involving numerous expert witnesses who 
only add to the extensive list of legal expenses incurred by both 
sides.43 Cases that reach a judgment on the merits may last three to 
seven years,44 and by that time changes in the market may have 
                                                 
2015 (2015), https://www.accmeetings.com/AM16/faculty/files/Article_482_ 
7928_LitSpend___AIPLA_2015_Report.pdf [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT] 
(calculating that the median cost of litigating a patent infringement case where the 
amount at stake is less than $1 million to be $600,000). 
 40 Julia Cronin-Gilmore, Exploring Marketing Strategies in Small Business, 1 
J. MARKETING DEV. & COMPETITIVENESS 6, 96 (2012) (“Small businesses drive 
the economy and sustain the technological lead in the global marketplace resulting 
in one-third of all new patents issued.”). 
 41 Ronspies, supra note 37, at 193. 
 42 Grace Heinecke, Pay the Troll Toll: The Patent Troll Model Is 
Fundamentally at Odds with the Patent System’s Goal of Innovation and 
Competition, 3 FORDHAM L. REV. 84 (2015) (describing how an entire industry of 
“patent trolls” has sprung up and how these trolls purchase large numbers of broad 
patents, usually from bankruptcy proceedings at a discounted price, and use the 
patents for the sole purpose of bullying small firms into paying licensing fees for 
using technology similar to that contained in the patent; if the small firm refuses 
to pay, the patent troll firm can sue and use its greater amount of capital to outlast 
the small firm in litigation.). 
 43 See ExpertPages, 2016 Expert Witness Fees & Practices Survey (2016), 
http://www.debow.com/documents/EP-2016Survey-ExecSummary-Final-
Archive.pdf (showing that the average hourly rate of an expert witness is $341 per 
hour). 
 44 Detkin, supra note 38, at 640. 
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already rendered the patent in question obsolete.45 For the solitary 
inventor, this can be devastating, especially because the patent suit 
itself is often time-consuming and draining—leaving little time for 
developing new ideas or technologies that can be patented and 
licensed.46 
Large entities often can easily divert resources to fight legal 
battles without hindering market performance or impeding 
development of future products, but small inventors do not share this 
advantage.47 Even if an individual manages to find a law firm willing 
to take her case on contingency48 and endures years of grueling court 
hearings, it is far from guaranteed she will receive appropriate 
compensation for successfully defending her patent rights.49 
Assuming the final decision awards the individual patent holder 
with a reasonable award for lost profit due to infringement, a 
substantial portion of that award—perhaps several million dollars’ 
worth50—necessarily reimburses her team of lawyers for years of 
legal work. After accounting for all legal fees, including the costs of 
expert witnesses (to persuade the court of the patent’s validity) and 
                                                 
 45 Ronspies, supra note 37, at 196 n.85 (quoting James V. Grimaldi, After 
Historic Flight, Wrights Went to Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2003, at E01 
[therein quoting a letter from Wilbur Wright to his lawyer: “Unnecessary delays 
by stipulation of counsel have already destroyed fully three fourths of the value 
of our patent . . . . The opportunities of the last two years will never return 
again.”]). 
 46 See id. at 201 (describing the difficulties encountered by small businesses and 
individual inventors in trying to stay afloat while also “devot[ing] substantial 
portions of . . . time to the defense of a patent”). Large corporations have the 
benefit of in-house counsel which can lead to “lower litigation costs.” 
 47 The economies of scale are clear: an entity with a yearly income of $50 
million can more readily afford an expensive patent case than an inventor who 
makes $50,000 a year. Id. at 185–86. 
 48 Often contingency represents an unappealing option for lawyers because 
damages in patent suits are often “difficult to calculate” or predict—and for 
patents which haven’t made it to market yet, the risk is even higher as the 
profitability of the patent is unproven. Id. at 197–198. 
 49 Id. at 199 (“[S]mall-entity patentees may find themselves granted an award 
of lost profits only to see it equaled or exceeded by the costs incurred during 
litigation.”). 
 50 Patent litigants in the United States can expect to pay anywhere from 
$600,000 to $5,000,000 to fight a case through appeal. See AIPLA REPORT, supra 
note 39, at 37. 
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at least one certified public accountant (to testify as to the patent’s 
market value in terms of lost profit),51 the individual inventor may 
find herself with little to no reward for retaining her intellectual 
property.52 
In sum, the current legal landscape for patent law rewards those 
with deep pockets and the luxury of excessive patience—the very 
two advantages seldom possessed by small entities and individual 
creators. The consequences of inequality in patent litigation are 
clear. As one commentator remarks, “These aspects of patent 
litigation can have negative social effects, including the relative 
chilling of innovative activity . . . .”53 Without improvements to the 
efficiency and accuracy of the current system, unhealthy power 
imbalances will linger in American patent law. 
IV.  PATENT LITIGATION AROUND THE WORLD 
A number of countries—including Japan, Great Britain, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Thailand—have implemented some 
type of judicial structure that explicitly handles intellectual property 
cases. Each system differs in scope and effectiveness, but each of 
these countries saw fit to give special attention to the highly complex 
and technical nature of patent litigation. 
A. Patent Litigation in Japan 
Recent reforms in Japanese intellectual property litigation 
naturally invite comparisons with the current patent trial system in 
the United States.54 Strengthening the comparison is the fact that 
                                                 
 51 See generally ExpertPages, supra note 43. 
 52 See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 39; see also Lauren Cohen et al., “Troll” 
Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1775 (2017) (arguing that the cost, complexity, and length of the average 
patent case creates a chilling effect on small inventors seeking patents at all, let 
alone litigating patents). 
 53 Cohen, supra note 52, at 1794. 
 54 Japanese reformers borrowed ideas from the U.S. patent system in their quest 
for increased efficiency. However, the Japanese purposefully avoided imitating 
the exact structure of American patent litigation, instead stretching beyond the 
U.S. system in an attempt to make the reforms specific to Japanese culture and 
society. In many respects the Japanese legal reforms are broader than any in recent 
U.S. history (including the creation of the CAFC). See Toshiko Takenaka, Success 
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both U.S. and Japanese trials rely on a form of the adversary 
system.55 Japan has an unusual combination of code in which “the 
Continental European system is maintained” while “the best 
characteristics of Anglo-American law have been adopted.” The 
“adoption of the adversary system in the court procedure” and a lay-
judge system for certain types of cases that acts “much like the jury 
system adopted in the United States and elsewhere”56 mean any 
comparison between the two countries’ legal procedures, while not 
synonymous, is arguably more compatible than any attempted 
parallel between the U.S. and a purely civil law country. 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the two legal 
systems is Japan’s lack of jury trials in the traditional American 
style.57 For this article, the absence of a jury is helpful, as we are 
interested in analyzing the effectiveness of patent courts with a 
reduced or eliminated role for the jury. 
However, a lack of lay juries in civil cases is not the only reason 
Japan’s revised legal structure is worth studying; both Japan and the 
United States have a long-lasting, deeply embedded tradition of 
                                                 
or Failure? Japan’s National Strategy on Intellectual Property and Evaluation of 
its Impact from the Comparative Law Perspective, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 379 (2009). 
 55 Use of the adversary system differentiates Japan from many other civil law 
countries. See generally SUP. CT. OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
JAPAN (2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9oy8uuh (providing an in-depth look at 
criminal trials in Japan and the basis of the Japanese legal system found in the 
systems of other countries). 
 56 Id. at 5–7. 
 57 See Randall R. Rader, The Comparative Moot Court with US and Japanese 
Patent Law 37, www.win-cls.sakura.ne.jp/pdf/2/36-37.pdf (“[T]he Japanese trial 
resembles a US trial without a jury.”). However, as of May 2009, the Japanese 
conduct criminal trials using the “saiban-in,” a mixed jury system combining three 
judges and six lay jurors on a single panel. Lay jurors have an increased role in 
comparison to the responsibilities of jury members in the United States, as the 
Japanese jury can ask questions directly to witnesses. See Robert E. Precht, Japan, 
the Jury - Opinion - International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/01/opinion/01iht-edprecht.3738928.html. 
Because the function of Japanese patent courts is unaltered by the addition of a 
jury to criminal trials, any further discussion of the saiban-in is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
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courts headed by generalist judges.58 Specialization is the exception, 
not the rule. Both countries highly value judicial leaders with a 
broad array of knowledge,59 thus any divergence from a generalized 
court system deserves our attention. Japan’s rapid embrace of 
specialized patent courts counts as a noteworthy deviation, but these 
changes inspire a few questions: Why the strong desire to reform 
patent litigation? Why now? And why so quickly? 
1. Reform of Patent Protection in Japan 
Japan’s economy suffered greatly throughout the 1990s.60 With 
the new millennium approaching and no end in sight for its 
economic troubles, Japan sought to transform from a primarily 
industrial and manufacturing based economy to one based on 
information.61 One of the key elements identified in such a 
transformation was a much greater importance placed on promoting 
and protecting intellectual property.62 Having identified IP as a 
weakness and a key area of concern, Japan reformed its judicial 
                                                 
 58 Most Japanese judges train and perform as generalists, and many have no 
prior specialized knowledge of intellectual property before they arrive in the IP 
division. See Judge Shinohara Katsumi, A Retrospective and a Prospective Look 
at the First Year of the Intellectual Property High Court, 31 A.I.P.P.I., Sept. 2006 
[hereinafter Retrospective]; see also Judge Shinohara Katsumi, Outline of the 
Intellectual Property High Court of Japan, 30 A.I.P.P.I., May 2005, at 131 
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/200505.pdf [hereinafter Outline] (“In the 
United States, there seems to be a strong tendency to pick judges with wide 
knowledge and experience, with the so-called generalist preferred to the 
specialist.”). 
 59 See Outline, supra note 58. 
 60 See Naoyuki Yoshino & Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, Effectiveness of the 
Easing of Monetary Policy in the Japanese Economy, Incorporating Energy 
Prices, 14 J. COMP. ASIAN DEV. 227, 228–29 (2015) (describing the conditions 
surrounding Japan’s recession and the country’s struggles to spark economic 
growth). 
 61 See EDWARD J. LINCOLN, ARTHRITIC JAPAN: THE SLOW PACE OF ECONOMIC 
REFORM (2001) (describing the conditions surrounding Japan’s recession and the 
country’s struggles to spark economic growth). 
 62 See History, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT. (2005), http://www.ip.courts.go.jp 
/eng/aboutus/history/index.html (giving a comprehensive history of IP courts in 
Japan, including recommendations from the “Strategic Council on Intellectual 
Property” which suggested intellectual property should be one of Japan’s “top 
priorities”). 
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system to ensure greater quality and speed of litigation in patent 
cases (as well as those involving other IP, such as trademarks and 
copyrights).63 
Japanese courts have incorporated several Intellectual Property 
Divisions for almost sixty years,64 but it wasn’t until 2004 that 
Japanese officials amended the national district court structure and 
removed patent case jurisdiction from almost all district courts 
except those in Tokyo and Osaka.65 One year later, the IP High Court 
was established as a unique branch of the Tokyo High Court.66 Both 
judicial reforms were introduced, discussed, and implemented as 
part of a concerted effort to “reinforce the system for resolving IP 
cases with more expertise” and “ensure more effective and speedy 
trial proceedings in IP cases.”67 The IP High Court is roughly 
analogous to the CAFC, as both are appeals courts with national 
jurisdiction over patent litigation.68 Both courts’ powers are held in 
check by their respective Supreme Courts, although in practice, the 
relatively small number of cases accepted by each Supreme Court 
means both the IP High Court and CAFC are often the last court of 
appeal.69 Despite these similarities, several important factors 
                                                 
 63 See Judge Toshiaki Iimura, Intellectual Property Infringement Litigations 
and Recent Movement toward System Reforms, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT. (Sept. 
2004), http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/documents/thesis/thes_01_thesis_01/ 
index.html (detailing the process behind the reforms and the creation of the IP 
High Court). 
 64 See Outline, supra note 58, at 131 (“The half-century long history of the 
intellectual property division . . . of the Tokyo High Court opens a new page with 
the start of the Intellectual Property High Court as a kind of ‘special branch’ 
within the Tokyo High Court as of April 1, 2005.”). 
 65 See Chief Judge Ryuichi Shitara, Decade History and Future Prospects of 
Intellectual Property High Court, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT. (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/2015syotyoukouen.pdf (noting these two 
district courts now have exclusive “first instance” jurisdiction for all civil patent 
cases as well as any other intellectual property disputes). 
 66 See Iimura, supra note 63. 
 67 History, supra note 62. 
 68 But see Shitara, supra note 65 (providing that one major difference between 
Japanese High Court and the CAFA is Japan’s IP High Court only handles IP 
cases (both infringement and validity) whereas the CAFC hears other appeals in 
addition to patent disputes). 
 69 See Outline, supra note 58, at 146. 
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distinguish the Japanese IP courtroom as more specialized than its 
American counterpart. 
2. Embrace of Specialization 
First and foremost, the experience of Japan’s intellectual 
property judges is considerable.70 Every patent case funnels through 
the IP divisions of just two district courts, resulting in more yearly 
patent cases for each IP judge than an American district court judge 
might see in a lifetime.71 Increased repetition yields familiarity with 
complicated court procedures and ideally results in higher efficiency 
and more reliable case outcomes.72 Judicial experience is further 
enhanced by efforts to share case information among the patent 
judges of each IP court. In fact, Japan’s IP judges hold monthly 
meetings to keep one another abreast of current cases.73 This 
information sharing unifies the IP Division judges and contributes 
to greater consistency in court decisions.74 
Another source of consistency is the Grand Panel system, which 
was formed as part of the IP High Court.75 Acting as a court within 
a court, the Grand Panel is a five-judge tribunal that meets 
                                                 
 70 See Outline, supra note 58, at 137–138; see also Retrospective, supra note 
58, at 200 (discussing how Japanese judges, initially trained as generalists, 
develop expertise in intellectual property litigation through repeated exposure to 
“technical matters” in “highly specialized cases”). 
 71 “Estimates suggest that a [U.S.] district court judge presides over less than 
one patent trial per year on average.” Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States 
Designate Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 In 
Light of the English Experience and the Work of Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 176–77 (2009). In contrast, the IP High Court sees 
roughly 600–700 cases per year, split among eighteen judges. See Judge Koichi 
Tanaka, IP High Court Judge, Intensified Case Management in Specialized Courts 
of Japan (Apr. 2007), http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/070412.pdf. 
 72 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Outline, supra note 58, at 146 (“[T]he [IP High Court] judges are required 
to be aware of the cases presided over by other judges at all times, especially the 
cases pending at other divisions . . . .”). 
 74 See id. (“[T]he sense of unity . . . is [as] strong as ever before among the 
judges belonging to the IP Division.”). 
 75 See Shitara, supra note 65, at 9 (“It is internationally noteworthy that the High 
Court level decisions including Grand Panel judgment and decisions has been 
rendered in Japan promptly as a result of efficient proceedings of the court.”). 
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irregularly to hear “extremely important matter[s] of law.”76 Similar 
in function to the en banc panel of the CAFC,77 the Grand Panel was 
created to provide a cohesive opinion of Japanese patent judges on 
important IP issues of the day, without having to wait for a case to 
slowly make its way to the Supreme Court on appeal.78 Grand Panel 
decisions—along with the continual sharing of information and 
discussion among IP judges—enhance the reliability and 
consistency of Japan’s patent courts.79 In addition, specialization 
allows the IP High Court judges to focus on becoming intellectual 
property experts. To that end, they participate in continuing 
education programs, attend conferences, and even take university 
courses to learn more about the process of research and development 
in the private sector.80 
3. A System of Experts 
Besides the experienced judicial core, Japan’s IP courts are 
characterized by their extensive use of scientific and technical 
experts.81 While it is unrealistic to expect patent judges without 
scientific or technical degrees to maintain a level of specialized 
knowledge equal to a person “skilled in the art” of a particular 
field,82 patent cases demand judges be temporary experts for the 
                                                 
 76 The IP High Court normally serves as an appeals court that decides matters 
of fact, with the Supreme Court primarily deciding matters of law. See Outline, 
supra note 58, at 146. The Grand Panel is simply a collaborative system for 
establishing “reliable rules” earlier in the patent litigation process. Id. 
 77 Unlike the CAFC’s en banc panel, the Grand Panel does not consist of every 
active judge in that court; rather, only five judges are present for each case. Id. 
Additionally, as the primary goal of the Grand Panel is to provide reliable and 
consistent standards, the judges are required to come to a unanimous decision. See 
Retrospective, supra note 58, at 210. 
 78 See Outline, supra note 58, at 133. 
 79 See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 211. 
 80 See id. at 200–01 (describing the various ways in which judges on the IP High 
Court “take advantage of opportunities to develop their expertise”). 
 81 See JUDGE RYUICHI SHITARA, A NEW TREND IN IP LITIGATION (2006) (paper 
delivered at The Pan-European IP Summit in Brussels, Belgium), 
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/documents/pdf/thesis/061207_08_2.pdf (introducing 
the idea of the expert commissioners as “a unique system from [a] comparative 
law standpoint”). 
 82 To clarify, it seems unreasonable and perhaps even far-fetched to expect 
judges with little technical expertise to understand a complex biotechnology 
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duration of the trial.83 This scientific expertise requires resources to 
bring judges up to speed in a reliable, efficient, and neutral manner. 
Two separate entities—research officials and the expert 
commissioner system—offer personal assistance to Japanese IP 
judges during complex cases.84 
Research officials are full-time clerks assigned to an IP 
division.85 Each official comes from either the Japanese Patent 
Office (“JPO”) or a private patent firm, and each is chosen for 
having expertise in a specific technical area.86 While the extent of 
involvement for research officials generally depends on the court 
and the specific case in question,87 their role includes questioning 
involved parties and strengthening their understanding before 
composing an official opinion for the case judges.88 The research 
officials fill a valuable role in the decision-making process, but in 
some twenty percent of all IP cases in Japan, judges require an even 
more specific level of advanced expertise to ensure they understand 
the particular technical aspects of a claim.89 
Enter the expert commissioner system: as unique as it is helpful, 
this group of part-time, court-appointed advisors is composed of 
over two hundred experts from a multitude of backgrounds.90 Unlike 
                                                 
patent with the same expertise as a veteran biologist—and yet, during patent trials 
these judges are expected to do just that. Court-provided experts provide an 
avenue for judges to quickly and accurately enhance their knowledge in a neutral 
manner. 
 83 See Outline, supra note 58, at 136–37. 
 84 Id. at 138–40. 
 85 See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 201. 
 86 Id. (“Because all research officials sit in a single room, they can easily 
exchange information with each other and can deal with technical matters outside 
his or her field of expertise.”). 
 87 Research officials for the IP High Court typically have a more significant role 
throughout the case as compared to the Tokyo and Osaka district courts. Id. 
 88 The opinion may be delivered either orally or via written report. Id. 
 89 Around forty percent of Japanese patent court cases may have a use for expert 
commissioners, but judges feel comfortable with provided evidence in roughly 
half of those cases. Id. at 212–13. 
 90 See Shitara, supra note 81, at 4–5 (providing that expert commissioners are 
“chosen from among leading experts of various technical fields, including 
university professors, researchers at public organizations or private companies 
and patent attorneys”). 
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in other countries—such as Germany, where experts are rarely used 
and often add extensive time to the length of a case91—the Japanese 
eagerly use these scientific and technical professionals to aid patent 
judges’ comprehension. At least one expert commissioner is 
assigned to intricate cases, and up to three commissioners may work 
together, depending on the nature and complexity of a case.92 These 
experts play a significant role in interpreting highly technical 
evidence and arguments for the judges. However, it is important to 
note statements from expert commissioners may not be used as 
actual evidence; rather, a commissioner’s purpose is to help the 
judges understand the nature of evidence submitted by both parties.93 
So far, the expert commissioners have been successful in providing 
IP judges with the ability to make higher quality, more efficient, and 
more confident decisions.94 
                                                 
 91 See GAR YEIN NG, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR THE 
EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, WORKING GROUP ON THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE, STUDY 
ON THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
MEMBER STATES 20 (2014), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
534f89eee4b0aedbe40ae270/t/558a6d15e4b0dfba0a2afcc8/1435135253774/3rev
_2014_CEPEJ-GT-QUAL_RoleExperts_en.pdf (introducing experts into the 
German patent litigation process causes delays in an estimated 20-50% of cases); 
see also Wolfgang von Meibom & Boris Kreye, Germany, 142 MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP., Sept. 2004, at 39, 40 (revealing that appointment of court experts 
“is the exception rather than the rule” in German courts). 
 92 See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 213 (“An expert commissioner 
specializing in a field can be combined with others specializing in the neighboring 
fields . . . such collaboration would contribute to higher quality of technical 
explanation and smoother case management.”). 
 93 See Shitara, supra note 81, at 5. (“Although explanations given by expert 
commissioners in the proceedings are not competent as evidence in principle, they 
are very useful to help the court to deepen its understanding of the invention and 
other references involved in the case and to make a decision based on the 
evidence.”). 
 94 See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 213–14 (“[W]ith assistance of expert 
commissioners, judges can identify genuine issues among various allegations, 
request parties to voluntarily withdraw unnecessary arguments, and focus their 
arguments and case on narrowed issues, which contributes to expeditious 
proceedings.”). Katsumi goes on to discuss a positive side effect: parties put more 
effort into preparing good arguments for cases with expert commissioners 
involved. In the end, the added expertise “increases reliability and confidence of 
parties in the judiciary.” Id. 
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4. Results of Reform 
 
Case type Length, 
1998 
Length, 
2008 
% Change Length, 
2016 
First-instance IP 
cases in district 
courts 
25.7 13.7 - 53.1% 13.3 
Appeals to IP 
High Court from 
district courts 
11.5 7.7 - 67.0% 8.3 
District trial + 
appeal to IP High 
Court 
37.2 21.4 - 57.5% 21.6 
Appeals to IP 
High Court from 
JPO decisions 
17.2 8.0 - 46.5% 8.0 
IP Appeals to any 
appeals court 
12.1 7.7 - 63.6% 7.8 
JAPANESE IP CASES, AVERAGE TIME INTERVALS FROM 
COMMENCEMENT TO DISPOSITION, IN MONTHS95 
 
The system has been in place for fifteen years now, and the 
results have been promising from the beginning. The length (and 
therefore cost) of legal disputes dropped dramatically from 2003 to 
2008 and have remained consistent as Japan’s legal reforms 
stabilized and its judges gained more experience with court 
procedures and found more confidence in their roles as highly 
trained specialists. 
Japan’s two-part combination of specialized patent courts and 
judges and a robust system of scientific and technical experts present 
                                                 
 95 Statistics, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT., http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/ 
documents/statistics/index.html (providing a database of Japanese patent case 
intervals from 1998 to 2016). 
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a compelling alternative to expensive, lengthy patent litigation in the 
United States. Two additional points strengthen this comparison: 
Japan’s tradition of legal generalists, which mirrors the American 
preference for “jack of all trades” judges, and the influence of the 
American legal system on the recent Japanese reforms. While 
Japanese patent litigation may not be perfect,96 the United States 
would certainly do well to investigate the benefits of juryless, 
specialized district courts in the context of patent protection. 
B. Patent Litigation in Europe 
Filing intellectual property lawsuits in Europe is complex, given 
no central source exists for the resolution of patent disputes.97 The 
European Patent Office (EPO) primarily accepts, revokes, and 
invalidates patents; any infringement cases must be initiated 
separately in each European country where the alleged infringement 
takes place.98 However, the prospect (and expense) of fighting a 
dozen simultaneous battles is enough to give pause to many 
patentees, even those with deep pockets, and this strategy makes 
even less sense considering the first case’s decision often has 
considerable bearing on the same case in other countries around 
Europe.99 For these reasons, one common approach is to “test the 
                                                 
 96 See Takenaka, supra note 54, at 391–93 (discussing issues such as (1) the 
negative effect of the IP High Court on certainty as to patent validity, (2) limited 
damages awarded compared to those of the United States, and (3) the extremely 
low chance of a Japanese court actually finding infringement). While Takenaka 
rightfully criticizes these problems, he also concedes “[t]he Japanese government 
was successful in creating a court system more advanced than its U.S. counterpart 
in dealing with IP issues.” Id. at 390. 
 97 See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & Nicolas Van Zeebroeck, Comparing 
Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655 
(2014) (examining the downsides of the fractured European patent system and 
how European policy makers, recognizing these downsides, are in the process of 
establishing a unitary patent system for Europe). 
 98 See European Patent Office, Facts and Figures 2009, EPO 8–9, 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/5ba711cb78950ed3c125
75b500421775/$FILE/epo_facts_and_figures_2009_en.pdf (describing the 
EPO’s role in granting patent protection in almost forty countries throughout 
Europe, all with a single application). 
 99 See Naomi Rovnick, German Efficiency Shames Patent Court into Rethink, 
THE LAWYER 2 (Aug. 19, 2002) (“[I]f they believe their patents have been 
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waters” by filing a single infringement lawsuit in a country that 
promises inexpensive proceedings and a quick, definitive 
outcome.100 
Germany has emerged as the “most popular European 
jurisdiction”101 for patent litigation as it offers experienced specialist 
judges, streamlined procedures, and comparatively fast decisions—
all of which contribute to lower costs. While IP cases in the United 
Kingdom are usually more expensive than those in Germany, the 
numbers still pale in comparison to the average expense of taking a 
patent case through appeal in the United States.102 In addition to cost, 
both European countries share important similarities regarding 
patent litigation, one of which is the use of experienced justices.103 
Specialized judges with large amounts of experience reign in 
Europe, whether the legal system is based in civil law (Germany) or 
common law (England). German patent infringement disputes are 
heard by judges assigned strictly to handle patent cases, and 
although these judges may not always have a technical background, 
they gain experience quickly due to high case volume and the nature 
of specialization.104 Likewise, specialized judges have decided 
patent cases in Britain for decades.105 Although the UK sees fewer 
                                                 
infringed they will have to bring a case in every European country. But it is that 
vital first case that will influence judgments in the rest of Europe.”). 
 100 One patent lawyer remarked, “[I]f I want an injunction quickly, I’ll often go 
to Germany.” Id. 
 101 German patent courts hear roughly 600 cases a year, whereas during the first 
six months of 2002, the UK Patent Court “heard just 26 applications or trials.” Id. 
 102 One estimate places the cost of an English patent case at anywhere from 
$490,000 to $3,365,000, whereas clients would need to spend somewhere 
between $600,000 and $5,000,000 to fight a patent dispute through appeal in the 
U.S. See Michael Burdon, The UK: Can a High-cost Country Change its Ways?, 
WIPO MAG., Feb. 2010, at 6–8; AIPLA REPORT, supra note 39, at 37; see also 
von Meibom & Kreye, supra note 91, at 40 (revealing that filing in Germany 
might only cost $75,000 to $150,000, depending on case complexity). 
 103 See generally Graham & Zeebroeck, supra note 97 (summarizing the 
similarities between U.K. and German courts). 
 104 See von Meibom & Kreye, supra note 91, at 39. 
 105 While the Patents Court was only created in 1977, anyone disputing a patent 
in England over the past sixty years has likely presented their case in front of a 
specialized patent judge. See Gitter, supra note 71, at 183 n.70. 
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overall patent cases than Germany,106 all British patent judges have 
a technical background.107 
One major difference between the countries arises within their 
individual court structures. British patent judges belong to one of 
two specialized patent courts—the Patents Court or the Patents 
County Court—but both courts utilize identical procedures, share 
jurisdiction for all patent-related cases, and hear both infringement 
and validity disputes.108 Patent litigation in Germany is bifurcated, 
so judges hear either infringement or validity cases, but not both.109 
Adjudication of infringement cases occurs in special “patent 
chambers” within the Landgericht, the German equivalent of district 
courts, and these hearings are overseen by judges much closer to 
generalists in nature.110 The opposite is true for invalidation 
decisions, which are brought in a separate court, the 
Bundespatentgericht (hereinafter “German Federal Patent Court”), 
and presided over by “judges with both legal and technical 
training”.111 Despite these structural differences, both types of patent 
disputes are spearheaded by judges experienced with the 
complexities of patent litigation.112 Notably, neither Great Britain 
nor Germany employ juries in patent trials, as introducing lay 
                                                 
 106 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 107 Gitter, supra note 71, at 185 (“[S]ome of the judges in the English system 
possess a technical degree, and ‘all have technical experience.’”). 
 108 See id. at 182-85. 
 109 Katrin Cremers et al., Patent litigation in Europe, 44 EUR. J. L. ECON. 1, 5–
6 (2017) [hereinafter Europe] (“The [Landgericht] have no jurisdiction to decide 
on the validity of a patent—neither in form of a defense against a patentee’s claims 
for patent infringement nor in form of a (counter-) claim for declaratory judgment 
of invalidity. This is referred to as bifurcation of infringement and validity 
proceedings. In both patent and utility model infringement proceedings the 
infringement court has the discretion to stay the proceedings until parallel 
revocation proceedings before EPO, DPMA (Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt) 
and BPatG (Bundespatentgericht) have come to a conclusion.”). 
 110 See generally Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of 
the Bifurcated Patent Litigation System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218, 221 
(2016) [hereinafter Invalid]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See id. 
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participants into either system would likely undermine the 
efficiency created by specialization.113 
Such efficiencies are clear given a comparative analysis of trial 
costs and lengths. Though England is known as for being an 
expensive place for patent litigation,114 a British patent dispute could 
potentially cost as little as one-quarter to one-half of an equivalent 
case in the United States.115 Patent litigation in Germany is even 
cheaper,116 and relatively short case lengths make it an extremely 
attractive venue for those looking to begin defending their patents 
in Europe.117 The sheer number of annual cases in German patent 
courts suggests patent holders appreciate the speed and efficiency of 
the system.118 
                                                 
 113 See id. at 224 n.22 (“A key argument for specialization is that sufficient 
judicial expertise with the law as well as with technology is crucial for accurate 
decision-making in patent litigation. (cf. Moore, 2001; Pegram, 2000; Kesan and 
Ball, 2011). In particular, in order to accurately determine a patent’s validity, 
judges require a sound understanding of the relevant, potentially invalidating, 
prior art.”). See generally Europe, supra note 109 at 6–7 (discussing the patent 
system in four litigation systems including Germany and the UK). Juries are 
experienced neither as lawyers nor in patent litigation, and many lack expertise in 
even one highly technical field, much less multiple complex areas of study. A 
quote from the Honorable Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, commenting on how jury trials have stuck around in American patent law 
despite its roots in English common law: “even England stopped having jury trials 
in patent cases at the beginning of the last century.” Gitter, supra note 71, at 184 
note 82 (citation omitted). 
 114 Alastair J. McCulloch, Patent Litigation in Europe: The U.K. Returns as a 
Forum of Choice, JONESDAY (2006), https://www.jonesday.com/Patent-
Litigation-in-Europe-The-UK-Returns-as-a-Forum-of-Choice-05-05-2006/. 
 115 See Burdon, supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 116 See von Meibom, supra note 91, at 41. 
 117 See Graham & Zeebroeck, supra note 97, at 667 (indicating that German 
patent trials usually take 12-18 months to see a judgment, whereas UK trials can 
take 24-36 months); see also von Meibom, supra note 91, at 39 (stating that for 
infringement cases, it can take up to 9-12 months to receive a first instance 
judgment in Germany and a “hearing on the merits” can take less than a day; an 
appeal can take 12 to 15 months). 
 118 See Graham & Zeebroeck, supra note 97, at 667 (If patentees were unhappy 
with the speed, quality or consistency of decisions from the German specialized 
courts, they would simply take their disputes elsewhere in Europe.). 
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One unique factor of the German system is, surprisingly, the rare 
use of expert witnesses.119 While judges have the capability to 
appoint a neutral expert as a court aide to understand the important 
facts of a case, often German patent judges rely solely on their own 
extensive technical capabilities.120 Arguably this expertise is closely 
linked to the nature of the German court system itself. It would be a 
stretch to suggest generalist district court judges in America could 
ever match the knowledge and efficiency of specialized German 
patent judges, but these differences lie primarily in the natural 
structure of each country’s legal system.121 
In short, the German courts are directed by two major principles: 
specialization and decentralization, i.e., there are several different 
types of German courts that handle specific types of cases, and the 
rulings these courts give tend not to affect German law as a whole.122 
These are derived primarily from Germany’s “federal nature” and 
the “historical development and codification of German law.”123 
Civil law lends itself toward specialization because often the code is 
complicated, requires extensive familiarity, and serves as the 
primary source of answers for judges.124 As such, generalist 
experience becomes less efficient compared to specific knowledge 
of a particular section of civil code.125 In Germany, five areas of 
law—one being intellectual property litigation—are represented by 
independent courts of non-overlapping jurisdiction, each with 
                                                 
 119 See von Meibom, supra note 91, and accompanying text. 
 120 Jim Patterson, Übung Macht den Meister: How US District Courts can 
Better Adjudicate Patents by Learning from Germany’s Specialized Courts, 
CASRIP Newsletter 27 (Winter 2000) (https://tinyurl.com/y7gt2ozr). 
 121 See Sarang Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from 
the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1267–68 (2005) (quoting 
Judge Henry Friendly regarding the complexity of law and the increasing 
difficulty of maintaining competence as a generalist judge: “[I]t is altogether 
absurd to expect any single judge to vie with an assemblage of law professors in 
the gamut of subjects . . . that may come before his court.”). 
 122 See generally Invalid, supra note 110. 
 123 Damle, supra note 121, at 1289–90 n.104 (quoting NIGEL G. FOSTER, 
GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 38 (2d ed. 1996)). 
 124 Damle, supra note 121, at 1290–91. 
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specialized judges well-versed in their respective legal code.126 
German judges have more direct control over courtroom 
proceedings than their American counterparts as a result of the 
inquisitorial system,127 but the nature of civil law means judicial 
decisions in Germany technically have no effect on the law itself, 
unlike in the United States.128 
Despite these fundamental differences, we need not dismiss the 
German experience as foreign and unapproachable. As the Japanese 
have recently shown, it is possible to create legal reforms which 
respond to the need for increased specialization in a way that still 
respects the nature of the current system. Perhaps we can ask some 
difficult questions and reconsider the role of juries and generalist 
judges in a patent system filled with inefficiencies and power 
inequalities.129 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States holds democracy as one of its defining values, 
and the use of lay juries in its judicial system is a natural 
manifestation of that value. Yet, there are certain technical topics 
that the average layperson is not well equipped to handle simply 
because they have not spent the enormous amount of time required 
to become an expert in that field. The United States need not hinder 
                                                 
 126 Id. at 1286; see also Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter 
Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS 
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specialization with skepticism and contempt; but given the severe problems in 
patent adjudication in the district courts, and the significant costs of patent cases, 
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itself with tradition when other nations have different and 
demonstrably more efficient methods of handling patent trials. 
Specialized patent courts and technically trained judges have led to 
cheaper, faster patent trials for Japan and several European Union 
countries, especially Germany and the United Kingdom. The 
specialized, expert-based patent trial methods utilized by these 
countries are not incompatible with the United States’ legal system; 
it is perhaps the American public’s faith in democracy as a solution 
to all administrative issues that serves as the greatest obstacle to the 
implementation of these judicial techniques. 
Experts undoubtedly make mistakes and are susceptible to 
ordinary cognitive biases when forming their judgment. Democracy 
is in large part a method of sparing us from abuses of power. 
Democracy that ignores knowledge acquired from intense training 
and extensive experience in the relevant field of study denies itself 
the fruits of specialization. 
